The Marrow of Sacred Divinity - William Ames (1642)

1. THere be two parts of obedience. Vertue, and the action of Vertue. 2. Pet. 1. 5. Ad to your Faith Vertue, &c. For if these things be with you and abound, they will make you that yee shall neither be barren nor unfruitfull in the knowledge of our Lord Iesus Christ.

2. This distribution is of the whole into members▪ for these two are in their own nature joyned together, and doe make one and the same obedience.

3. Hence both vertues and their actions are set forth by the same name, and are explained also by the same definition, because they are altogether of the same nature: even as arguments of Logicke, are of the same name and nature, whether they be considered alone and by themselves, or in Axioms, and Syllogismes.

4. Vertue is an habit whereby the will is inclined to doe well.

5. It is called an habit, not as it is distinguished from disposition, and signifieth a confirmed and perfect constitution of mind: for such a degree of vertue is scarce granted to men, while they live heere: but generally, as it containes both a perfect and also imperfect degree of Vertue, and state of the mind.

6. But it is called an habit, not onely because it is had, but also because it maketh the subject¹⁶⁰ which it is in to have it selfe in a certaine manner, that is, it determines the faculty to good, which otherwise is not determined, in which sence this word is found, Hebr. 5. 14. Who by reason of habit, have their sences exercised to discerne good and evill.

7. It is in the will. First, because the will is the proper subject of the Theology as it is the proper principle of life, and of morall and spirituall actions. 2. Because the will is that faculty which is properly carried unto good that is honest, Rom. 7. 19. 21. 3. Because vertue is an habit that is or elective, the proper, and immediate operation whereof is voluntary election. 4. Because the will doth commend the other faculties, and so Vertue doth most agree to it, that all may be directed aright. 5. Because the will is neither by it selfe, nor by reason sufficiently determined to good actions, and so it hath need of its owne and internall disposition to worke aright. 6. Because the other faculties may he compelled, and by consequence one may whether he will or no lose vertue, if it should have the proper and fixed seat, in them. 7. Because that praise is most properly due to the actions of the will, and to the operations of the other faculties, so far forth as they flow from and depend upon the will; but that it is proper to vertue to be praise-worthy, not onely the Philosophers teach, but also the Apostle, Philippians 4. 8. If there be any vertue, if any prayse. 8. Because neither the understanding can be the subject of vertue, because intellectuall habits, although they bee most perfect, yet they doe not make a man good, nor any sensitive appetite, because true vertue is found in Angels, and the soules being separated from bodies, which are void of this appetite: yet there are often in the sensitive faculties some dispositions, which cause that the will commanding aright is more easily obeyed, and in that respect they have a certaine resemblance of Vertue.

8. Vertue is said to incline to God. First, that it may be distinguished from a vitious¹⁶¹ habit whereby men are inclined to evill. Rev. 7. 17. 20. 23. 2. That it may be distinguished also from those perfections of the mind, which indeed doe bring light, whereby the will may direct it selfe as well doing, but not incline it to doe right.

9. Hence, First, true and solid vertues, doe alwayes make him good in whom they are: not that the very dispositions that doe inhere in us, are the grace making us first accepted with God, as the Schoolemen speake, for that pertaines to Faith; but because they are reciprocated with a good man, and goodnesse is derived from them into our actions.

10. Hence also none can use vertue amisse, as being the principle of action; when notwithstanding men may, and are wont to abuse any habit of the mind.¹⁶²

11. Therefore those vertues which are wont to be called intellectuall, have not an exact respect of vertue.

12. Moreover vertue is said to incline not onely to good, but also to well doing: because the manner of action doth chiefly flow from vertue.

13. But as the rule of well-doing, so also the rule of vertue is the revealed will of God, which only hath the force of a certaine rule in those things which pertains to the direction of life.

14. That is a Lesbian rule¹⁶³ of vertue which Aristotle, puts to be the judgement of prudent men: for there are never such wise men, to whose judgement wee may alwayes stand: neither if there were, they could not bee alwayes knowne or consulted with by those who exercise themselves in Vertue.

15. That which is said to be right reason, if absolute rectitude be looked after, it is not else-where to be sought for then where it is, that is, in the Scriptures: neither doth it differ from the will of God revealed for the direction of our life. Psal. 119. 66. Teach me the excellency of reason and knowledge: for I believe thy precepts. But if those imperfect notions concerning that which is honest, and dishonest, be understood, which are found in the mind of man after the fall: seeing they are imperfect and very obscure, they cannot exactly informe vertue; neither indeed doe they differ any thing from the written Law of God, but in imperfection and obscurity only.

16. Therefore there can be no other discipline of vertue then Divinity, which delivers the whole Will of God revealed, for the directing of our reason, will, and life.

17. They that thinke otherwise, doe bring no reasons, which may move an understanding and sound man. They say the end of Divinity is the good of grace: but the end of Ethicks is a morall or civill good. As if no morall or civill good were in any respect, a good of grace and spirituall. As if the proper good, blessednesse, or end of man, were manifold, or as if that should be a vertue of a man, which doth not lead a man to his end, and chiefe good. They say that Divinity is exercised about the inward affections of men; but Ethicks about the outward manners. As if either Ethicks (which they define a prudence to governe the will and appetite) did not respect the inward affection: or that Divinity did not teach as well outward, as inward obedience.

They would have it that Ethickes are concluded in the bounds of this life, but that Divinity extends to a future. As if a blessed life were not one; or that of one and the same life, there were one rule, as it is present, and another as it is to come. They say the subject of Ethickes is a man, approved, good and honest: but the subject of Divinity is a godly and religious man; when notwithstanding the Apostle doth expresly teach that Divinity instructs us to live not only piously and religiously, but also temperatly, and justly, that is, approvedly and honestly, Tit. 2. 12. Ad to these, that the most eager defenders of the contrary opinion, doe acknowledge and contend, that morall vertues are the image of God in man, and so a degree of Theologicall vertue; and that morall vertue compared to spirituall is as warmth to heat, and the morning-light to the noone-light. As therefore warmth and heat, morning, and noone-light are taught in the same act: so also vertue morall and spirituall.

18. Therefore that judgement, and wish of that greatest master of arts, Peter Ramus,¹⁶⁴ was no lesse pious then prudent:

If I should wish for that which I would obtaine, I had rather that this learning of philosophy were delivered to children out of the Gospell, by some Divine that is learned, and of approved manners, then out of Aristotle by a Philosopher. A child will learne many impieties out of Aristotle, which it is to be feared, that he will forget too late. That the beginning of blessednesse, doth arise out of men; that the end of blessednesse is bounded in man: that all vertues are wholy contained in mans power, that they are obtained by mans nature, art, and industry. That though these workes, are great and Divine, yet that God is never used to them, either as an aider, or workeman: that Divine providence is removed from this theatre of humane life: of Divine Iustice, that there is not a word spoken: that mans blessednesse is placed in this fraile Life, &c.

19. But the same habit which is called vertue, as it doth incline in his manner unto God, is also called a gift, as it is given of God, and inspired by the holy Spirit: and it is called grace, as it is freely bestowed, by the speciall favour of God upon us; also in respect of the perfection which it hath, together with the profit and sweetnesse, which is perceived from is, is it called fruit: and in respect of the hope it brings of life eternall, it is called blessednesse by some.

20. They therefore doe weary themselves in vaine, who make seven gifs of the spirit out of Isay 11. 2. Upon whom the spirit of Iehova shall rest. The Spirit of wisdome and understanding, the spirit of counsell and of might, the spirit of knowledge and of the feare of Iehova: and doe carefully distinguish them from vertues, and have enough to doe to demonstrate the proportion of every of them to some vertue. For neither are there only seven gifts of the spirit, although there are no more (nay but six) reckoned up there: because there only the chiefe and most kingly giftsin respect of the subject are remembred (for it is there spoken of Christ) other gifts by a Synecdoche being understood: neither those gifts themselves whereof there is mention made there, are in very deed distinguished from vertues, but they doe by a metonymy, set forth all vertues by their causes.

21. For although those Graces, whereof there is mention, 1 Corinthians 12. 4. are in very deed distinguished from virtues: yet Grace when it notes an inherent perfection in us, doth either set forth some one vertue, or all joyntly as it were in his roote.

22. In vaine also are there twelve fruits of the spirit gathered out of Gal. 5. 22. The fruit of the spirit is Love, Ioy, Peace, Long-suffering, Kindnesse, Goodnesse, Faith, Meeknesse, Temperance, together with the addition which is found in the common translation: and they are compared to vertues, as is aforesaid of gifts; for neither are they only the fruits of the spirit, which are there expressed upon the present occasion, and are explained in that place with the names of the vertues themselves: because vertues are fruits, such as are required and expected by the husband-man, and doe agree to the nature of the seed which he did sow, and also bring profit and sweetnesse, with them, when they are perceived: all which doe agree to virtues, and their actions in a certaine manner in respect of God; but the profit chiefly in respect of us: whence also it is that holinesse with all vertues is not only called a fruit of the holy Spirit, but also our fruit, Rom. 6. 22. But this profit together with the sweetnesse is shewed in that place to the Galatians, in as much as joy, and peace are reckoned up, as fruits of the fruits.

23. They also use the same judgement, who thinke they have found eight beatitudes in the Sermon of Christ. Matth. 5. For there is but one beatitude, but seeing it hath divers signes, namely all solid vertues, together with the operations of them, the Lord doth propound certaine singular vertues, or operations of vertues, which doe most agree to his Kingdome, and are very remote from humane sence, and doth partly perswade them by the promise of blessednesse, and doth partly also describe blessednesse, or blessed men, by the study and profession of them.

24. The common affections of vertue, are those foure which are wont to be called Cardinall vertues.

25. For they doe not make foure kinds of vertues, as the most have hitherto thought, who doe manifest violence both to vertue and reason it selfe, whilest they will constrainedly refer all singular vertues to those heads: but they are foure conditions, which are necessarily required in that disposition which deserves the name of vertue.

26. The first of these is called Iustice in that generall sense, whereby it sets forth an inclination to doe rightly, giving every man his own, and it may be called the rectitude of vertue: for in that description of vertue which the Apostle doth propound in a certaine heap of words, Phil. 4. 8. Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any vertue, and if any praise, although truth, Iustice, purity doe set forth one and the same nature of vertue, yet Iustice doth most intimately set forth the essence of it.

27. The second is Prudence; whereby all the strength of reason is used to find out that which is right, and to direct a right all the meanes of it: it is therefore the alone descerning of those things which pertaine to right doing: and it containes in it selfe the force of understanding, knowledge and wisedome: so that all those perfections of the mind which are wont to be called intellectuall vertues, in this respect alone doe pertaine to vertue, so far forth as by the power of them the wil is directed in doing well.

28. It is called in the Scripture Spirituall understanding and wisedome, Col. 1. 9. Where understanding doth seeme to set forth a generall perceiving of good, and evill; and wisdome notes out the same perceiving as it is applied to severall things considered with their circumstances, wherewith they are clothed: so that understanding considering doth as it were say, It is lawfull: wisdome saith, It is expedient; according to that distinction which is, 1 Corinthians 6. 12 & 10. 23. To this is opposed, Foolishnesse. Ephesiant 5. 17. Be not therefore unwife, but understanding what the Will of the Lord is.

And Ignorance, Eph. 4. 18. Being strangers from the Life of God, by reason of the ignorance that is in them. It is also called Iudgement. 1 Cor. 2. 15. And Discerning, Phil. 1. 10. To which is opposed vanity of mind, Eph. 4. 17. And a mind voyd of all Iudgement, Rom. 1. 28.

29. This Prudence ought to be exercised, 1. With circumspection, taking heed and due diligence, which are often in the Scripture commended under the name of watchfulnesse. Marc. 13. 33. Take heed, watch and pray: unto which is opposed that drowsie sleepinesse which is said to have seised upon the foolish Virgins. Mat. 25. 5, 13. Secondly, with election upon a due proportion; so as the greater duties be preferred before the lesser, and in every one a covenient measure be kept according to the intending of affections and strength. Mat. 6. 33. 1 Cor. 12. 31. & 14. 1. Seeke first the Kingdome of God and the righteousnesse of it. Affect the greater gifts: but rather that yee may prophesie.

30. The third generall affection of vertue is fortitude, which is a firme persisting in doing rightly, enduring and overcomming all those difficulties which may arise either from the continuance of the act which is required, or from other impediments whatsoever. Hence it is that vertue in the Hebrew is set forth by the name Christ,¹⁶⁵ even when it is ascribed to Women. Prov. 31. 10. And a mighty strengthning is required in every vertue. Eph. 3. 16. It containes therefore. 1. That confidence which is commended. Acts 4. 29. To which feare is opposed, Phil. 1. 14. That they are bold to speak the word without feare. Secondly, perseverance and constancy, Revel. 2. 26. Whosoever shall overcome; and keep my workes unto the end. To which is opposed a fainting of mind and wearinesse of weldoing. 2. Thess. 3. 13. Gal. 6. 9. Hebr. 12. 3, 12. Let us not be weary. Be not weary. Least ye faint in your minds. Raise up the weake hands, and feeble knees. Thirdly, It containes sufferance or patience. Iames 5. 7, 8. Heb. 10. 36. Be of patient mind, and stablish your hearts. For ye have need of patience.¹⁶⁶

31. The fourth is Temperance, whereby all those desires which divert men from wel-doing are asswaged and restrained: and so it makes vertue undefiled. 2 Tim. 2. 4. None that goeth a warfare entangleth himselfe. 1 Pet. 1. 13. Gird up the loynes of your mind, be sober, &c. It is often called in Scripture Sobriety when that word is used in a more generall sence, as 1 Pet. 1. 13. & 5. 8. And purity or cleannesse of heart. 1 Tim. 1. 5. 1 Peter 2. 22. And also sincerity, as it doth exclude pollution of any mixture. This force of the word is shewed 2 Cor. 1. 12. With simplicity and sincerity of God, not with fleshly wisdom.

32. Of these foure conditions of vertue, the first doth order and as it were constitute vertue: the second doth direct and free it from error: the third doth strengthen it against inconveniences: the fourth makes it pure, and defends it against all allurements which doe seduce it.

33. All these vertues doe seeme to be prescribed, and explained together and almost by name. 2 Pet. 1. 4. & 6. Ad to Faith Vertue: that is Justice or an universall rectitude: to vertue knowledge, that is, Prudence directing aright all your wayes: to Prudence continence,¹⁶⁷ that is, that temperance whereby ye may containe your selves from all allurements of pleasures, wherewith men use to be fleshed, and drawen away from the right way: to continence patience, that is fortitude, whereby ye may endure any hardship for righteousnesse sake. But that which followes there of piety & charity doth containe a distribution of vertue, to be propounded in his proper place.

34. Yet because every of those affections¹⁶⁸ doe more appeare in some vertues then in other, therefore some speciall vertues doe take both their name and definition from them: for because an accurate rectitude doth most appeare in the number, measure, weight, and valew of those things which are mutually received and given by man, therefore Iustice, in a certaine speciall manner is wont to be placed in things of such sort. And because those inconveniences are held most terrible, which are wont to happen in warre and such like dangers, therefore the name of fortitude is wont to be restrained to such things. Because the pleasures of the sences are wont most to tickle, therefore temperance is for the most part placed in them only; although those three together with Prudence taken in a generall sence, are tied and folded together among themselves, as that Philosopher did observe, who did first almost propound those foure heads of vertues.

35. Whereas the forme of vertue is placed by many in a certaine mediocrity¹⁶⁹ between two vices in the extreame, that can be defended by reason. 1. Because privation is not the forme of an habit; but mediocrity, is nothing else then a privation of a defect and an excesse. 2. Because the forme of vertue is to be sought in that conformity which it hath to his rule: But this conformity doth neither only, nor chiefly, nor sometime at all consist in mediocrity. 3. Because vertue in its formall respect cannot be too much intended,¹⁷⁰ & so doth not admit excesse, but either in that materiall thing which it hath common with vices, or in the circumstances of operations, as when some of them are exercised when they ought not, or are not excercised when they ought.

36. That meane which is found in all vertues, is no other thing then a conformity to their rule, or measure: for by this they have certaine measures and bounds in which their nature is as it were contained, so that they 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 may not decline to the right hand or to the left, but by this reason mediocrity is no more the forme of vertues, then of all other things which are distinguished from other things by certaine formes and differences.

37. But those vertues which consist in the middle between two vitious habits,¹⁷¹ are not therefore vertues because they consist in the middle, but because they doe in that manner consist in the middle as their rule prescribes; in which manner, mediocrity whether of participation or negation, Rei vel rationis,¹⁷² of the thing, or of a respect, is to be considered rather as a subject matter, then as a perfecting forme.

38. But it is manifest that such mediocrity hath no place in some vertues: for the love of God is not in that respect praised that it is not too much, but that is is most ardent, here the measure is without measure.

39. There is the like reason of all vertues in respect of their proper and specificall nature.¹⁷³ Hee that giveth when he ought not, is not too liberall: but he is too much in giving, so that in that respect he ceaseth to be liberall, and in the same act he may be as much defective in not doing that which he ought.

40. The wiseman indeed admonisheth, Eccles. 7. 16. That we be not just overmuch, but this is not at all to be understood of Iustice in its nature (for it followes Verse 20. that there is none just upon Earth who doth good and sinned not) but as it is in opinion, whereby many doe challenge too much to themselves, and would have it attributed to Iustice: but in true vertues we ought alwayes to endeavour to this, that we may more and more abound, as in the holy Scriptures we are often admonished.

41. There be no degrees in vertue of one and the same kind, if it be considered in it selfe in the extent. For there is no vertue which at least in disposition doth not extend it selfe to all those things which are contained in the compasse of its object. He is not temperate which doth moderate himselfe in one way, and favours himselfe in others; but in respect of the subject some vertue is more strong in one then it is in another, either by reason of a more apt disposition by nature, or because of greater accustoming, or because of a more perfect judgement of reason, or finally because of a geater Gift of GOD.

42. That which is wont to be said, that vertues are increased by daily use and exercise, that must be so understood in solid vertues proceeding from sanctifying grace, that dayly exercise is the disposing cause, and by vertue of the promise of God in some sort the procuring cause, not principally or properly effecting such an increase of vertue.

43. But vertues are lessened by the opposite vitious acts, and in respect of the disposition which they bring, and by reason of the merit that is in them.

44. By how much the acts of vertues, or contrary vices are more intent, more frequent and more continuall, so much the more they prevaile, either to the increasing or diminution of vertues.

45. Hence is that distinction of vertues into humane and heroicall; into vertues purging, purged and exemplary: and of those that are endued with vertue, into Infants, and men of ripe age. Heb. 5. 13, 14.

46. The communion of vertues is both in the connexion and subordination of them among themselves.

47. For connexion is that whereby all vertues which are simply necessary, doe cleave together among themselves. 1. In respect of the beginning from whence they flow: For every good giving, and every perfect gift descends from the Father of lights; By the spirit of grace. Iames 1. 17. 1 Cor. 12. 2. In respect of the end and intention, which is to the same thing in generall; for all vertues doe so respect God, that if his authority be violated in one, it is withall virtually violated in all. Iames 2. 10. 3. In respect of that helping indeavour which they performe mutually one to another. For one vertue doth dispose to the act of another, and also doth defend and confirm the same with the act.

48. Yet vertues are not so essentially and intrinsecally knit together, that every one is of the essence of the other, or doth necessarily depend upon it as upon a procreating cause.

49. Subordination of vertues is that whereby the act of one vertue is ordered to the act and object of another, either as a meanes to an end which is the command of a superior upon an inferior vertue as Religion commands Iustice temperance, and the like, when it refers their acts to the furthering the worship and glory of God; or as a cause to its effect, which belongs to every vertue in respect to every one: for so Religion it selfe is ordained to bring forth and conserve Iustice.

50. Whensoever the act of one vertue is ordered to the end of another vertue, this ordination although in respect of the direction it depends upon Prudence, yet in respect of the effectuall force and authority, it depends upon a superior vertue.